ISLE OF ANGLESEY COUNTY COUNCIL

REPORT TO	**AUDIT COMMITTEE**
DATE	**22 JULY 2014**
SUBJECT	**TREASURY MANAGEMENT – FIRST QUARTER 2014/15**
LEAD OFFICER(S)	**RICHARD MICKLEWRIGHT**
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Nature and reason for reporting

To comply with regulations issued under the Local Government Act 2003 and with the Council's Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation for 2014/15 (Appendix 8 of the Treasury Management Strategy Statement 2014/15). This committee is responsible for scrutiny of treasury management matters.

1. This report is presented to ensure that the Council complies with the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Code of Practice for Treasury Management which recommends that Members should be updated on treasury management activities at least twice a year, but preferably quarterly.

2. The Council's treasury advisers (Capita) have provided a summary of the economic background and the economic outlook (Appendices 1 & 2) and have also recently provided the following forecast.

	Sept-14	Dec-14	Mar-15	June 15	Sept-15	Dec-15	Mar-16	June 16	Sept-16	Dec-16	Mar-17	June 17
Bank Rate	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.75%	2.00%	2.00%
5yr PWLB rate	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%
10yr PWLB rate	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.10%	4.20%	4.20%	4.30%	4.40%	4.40%
25yr PWLB rate	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.70%	4.80%	4.80%	4.90%	4.90%	4.90%	5.00%
50yr PWLB rate	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.70%	4.80%	4.80%	4.90%	4.90%	4.90%	5.00%

2.1 Capita Asset Services undertook a review of its interest rate forecasts in May, after the Bank of England's Inflation Report. However, more recent developments to the Bank of England's forward guidance have necessitated a second updating in this quarter carried out on 30 June. This latest forecast now includes a first increase in Bank Rate in quarter 1 of 2015 (previously quarter 4 of 2015).

3. At the beginning of the year, the Council's borrowing portfolio was all from PWLB and was £20.6m below the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) (i.e. part of the borrowing has been internalised). The Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2014/15 (Section 3.4.1) states that a flexible approach will been adopted with regards to the choice between internal and external borrowing. This has been, and will continue to be, the case, with consideration to all the factors listed in that section. The decision to continue to internalise has been driven mainly due to 2 factors: (1) To limit the Authority's exposure to credit risk (2) to limit the cost of carry. These are set against the backdrop of PWLB and investment rates continuing to remain at historically low levels with only a steady increase forecast into the medium term. The appointed treasury advisors (Capita Asset Services) have also supported the decision to continue to internalise borrowing at this time. Any changes to the current approach will be reported as appropriate.

4. The table shows the positions at the beginning and end of the quarter.

	30 June 2014		31 March 2014	
	£m	%	£m	%
Borrowing (all fixed rate)	89.6	5.72	89.6	5.72
Deposits – No notice	19.1	0.40	4.2	0.58
Deposits – Fixed Term (all < 1 year)	0.0	n/a	5.0	0.80
Total Deposits	19.1	0.40	9.2	0.70
Average Deposits in the Quarter	20.3	0.50	18.2	0.56

4.1 Details of the institutions holding the deposits can be found at Appendix 3.

4.2 During the period no new external borrowing was taken up, no loans matured and no debt rescheduling took place.

4.3 On the investments side, a fixed term deposit with the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) (£5m, 0.80%, 3 month duration) matured in May and this was then invested on a no notice basis only; this was in order to maintain flexibility and minimise risk and given the continued low level of interest rates.

There are two points worthy of note:-

- The list of creditworthy counterparties continued to be highly restricted, with very few counterparties standing up to the approved credit criteria; and
- Investment rates available in the market have continued at historically low levels.

4.4 In terms of continuing investments, it has previously been reported that there have been credit rating issues with Santander UK plc and suggested investment durations had been below the acceptable level for investment but that the bank's position had stabilised and improved over the year. Capita's suggested investment duration for Santander has not at any point during the quarter been below 100 days and at the time of preparing this report it stands at 6 months and our treasury advisors advice is that the bank is creditworthy enough to be invested in for far beyond our no notice commitment. The credit ratings and suggested investment duration for Santander during enabled it to be invested in for up to 6 months, with an investment limit of £7.5m and this has been adhered to during the quarter.

4.5 Given the continued challenges faced in investing funds in secure, creditworthy institutions, offering a reasonable rate of return for the risk, options are being investigated to diversify the investment portfolio (in terms of both types, and geographic locations of investments). Any developments will be reported back to the relevant committees as they as appropriate.

5. During the quarter the Council remained within its Prudential and Treasury Limits. The 'Mid-year Review Report' will provide an update and analysis of performance against the treasury and prudential indicators, with any amendments to the figures as appropriate.

6. There has not been any activity since the end of the quarter to note.

7. The plans for the rest of the year are:

- To continue to invest surplus balances in a way that ensures security as well as liquidity and yield;
- To continue to internalise borrowing whilst regularly monitoring market conditions;
- To monitor the market so that rescheduling can be undertaken at an appropriate time if opportunities are available;
- To respond to possible initiatives for using unsupported borrowing or one-off borrowing support.

8. RECOMMENDATION

To consider the content of the report.

RICHARD MICKLEWRIGHT **15 JULY 2014**
INTERIM HEAD OF FUNCTION (RESOURCES) & S151 OFFICER

ATODIAD / APPENDIX 1

Cefndir Economaidd / Economic Background

- During the quarter ended 30 June 2014:

  - Indicators suggested that the economic recovery accelerated;
  - Household spending rose again;
  - Inflation fell to its lowest level since September 2009;
  - The ILO measure of unemployment fell further to 6.6%;
  - The MPC suggested that the economy might warrant higher interest rates before the end of the year;
  - Low tax receipts put the fiscal tightening slightly off track; and
  - The European Central Bank (ECB) made announcements designed to boost bank lending and counter the risk of deflation.

- After a healthy quarterly expansion in UK GDP of 0.8% in Q1, some of the early indicators point to growth accelerating in the second quarter. On the basis of past form, the CIPS/Markit business activity surveys point to quarterly GDP growth of around 1.5% in Q2. Admittedly, the composite PMI has tended to overstate the pace of the recovery over the past year. However, survey data was also encouraging on the strength of the recovery in Q2. All of the headline figures in April's industrial production release were encouraging. Indeed, even if production only manages to hold steady in the remaining two months of the quarter, it would still be 0.7% higher in Q2 overall than in Q1. That said, the £2.5bn trade deficit in April, compared to £1.7bn last year, highlights that the recovery is still struggling to rebalance towards exports.

- Meanwhile, household spending looks to have supported further GDP growth in Q2. While retail sales volumes fell by 0.5% on the previous month in May, following strong growth in April, the underlying trend remains strong as a combination of rapid jobs growth and falling prices continues to fuel a recovery in consumer spending. In addition, the more forward-looking survey balances of expected sales also point to solid growth in consumer spending in the near-term. Furthermore, non-high street spending remained robust too. Annual growth in new car registrations averaged around 5% in April and May and the Bank of England's Agents' Survey recorded the measure of consumer services turnover at its joint highest level in May since 1998. So it still seems likely that overall household spending strengthened in the second quarter.

- The labour market has continued its strong recovery. Employment rose by a huge 345,000 in the three months to April, by far the biggest increase since records began in 1971. Despite an increase in the workforce, employment growth was enough to bring the headline (three-month average) unemployment rate down to 6.6% in April. In addition, the timelier claimant count measure of unemployment fell by 27,400 in May, potentially pointing to further falls in the broader ILO measure of unemployment. Nonetheless, pay growth has remained subdued, with headline annual growth (three month average) in average earnings (including bonuses) falling to 0.7% in April, well below inflation of 1.8%. Since real earnings have yet to rise, some consumers may be overstretching their finances in order to spend more.

- Meanwhile, after sending dovish messages through the May Inflation Report, the MPC's communications have now gone full circle, from trying to prevent interest rate expectations from rising too quickly via the introduction of forward guidance last summer, to trying to *raise* them now. A number of Committee members, including Governor Mark Carney, have warned of not-too-distant policy tightening.

- Indeed, the main factor that could dissuade the MPC from starting on an earlier path for increasing Bank Rate is inflation. CPI inflation fell to 1.5% in May, the lowest rate since late 2009. Recent developments, including sterling's further appreciation, falls in producer price inflation and very weak wages growth, suggest that CPI inflation could fall to as low as 1% later this year.

- Meanwhile, May's public borrowing figures contained tentative signs that the coalition is struggling to bring down the deficit in line with fiscal plans this year. The underlying measure of borrowing (PSNB ex. excluding APF and Royal Mail pension fund transfers) was £13.3bn in May, exceeding the consensus forecast of £12.2bn. The increase was largely driven by a drop in tax receipts, rather than strong increases in spending. Spending in April and May is around 9% higher than it was in the same period last year. However, it is still too early in the fiscal year to draw conclusions from these figures.

- One risk which continues to linger is an overheating housing market. Fears that a nationwide bubble is building will not have been assuaged by the Financial Policy Committee's (FPC) relatively timid action announced alongside June's Financial Stability Report. Indeed, the 15% limit on the proportion of the volume of new mortgages that can be advanced at a multiple of 4.5 times income or more is unlikely to prevent a further rise in high loan-to-income ratio lending, given that the limit is a fair way above the actual current proportion of 10%. Furthermore, the tweaks to the existing stress tests used to assess mortgage applicants seem unlikely to make a material difference either. Admittedly, the housing market has already shown some signs of slowing of its own accord. Indeed, approvals for new mortgages fell to an eleven-month low in May, and the new buyer enquiries balance of the RICS Housing Market Survey has continued to moderate. However, with supply remaining tight, further strong increases in house prices in the near-term look likely. Although the FPC could announce further measures at a later date, the timidity of its actions so far may have slightly increased the chances that the MPC could raise Bank Rate in the not too distant future.

- Internationally, the robust 217,000 increase in US non-farm payrolls in May is another encouraging sign that the economy is getting back on the right track after the weather-related weakness during the winter. The 0.6% m/m rise in US industrial production in May also suggests that activity is bouncing back. Meanwhile, the US Federal Reserve continued tapering its asset purchases by a further $10bn in June's policy meeting and highlighted that the benign outlook for inflation means monetary policy will remain loose for some time. The Fed lowered its forecasts for GDP growth and unemployment, but the FOMC's policy statement made no reference to the recent build up of price pressures.

- Activity indicators for the Eurozone suggest that the recovery only gained a little momentum in Q2. Moreover, the spectre of deflation continues to hang over the region. HICP inflation fell from 0.7% to 0.5% in May, the joint weakest rate since 2009 and far beneath the ECB's 2% price stability ceiling. Furthermore, unit labour costs have risen by just 0.1% in the past year. As developments in wages tend to affect wider measures of inflation after a short lag, the latest data suggests that consumer price inflation could fall even further. Accordingly, the ECB made a number of announcements in June designed to boost bank lending and counter deflationary risks, including rate cuts and potential asset purchases. However, the policies involved are not as bold as they might seem. The interest rate cuts were very small and the decision not to sterilise bond purchases made under the Securities Markets Programme amounts to just 1.7% of GDP.

- In the UK, equities continued to underperform, despite improving expectations for the strength and sustainability of the UK's recovery. Indeed, they have continued to underperform US equities, even though the consensus expects the UK to grow faster than the US in 2014. Meanwhile, gilt yields edged up – particularly at the short-end of the curve – following the MPC's communications in June, which were more hawkish than May's Inflation Report. In contrast, forward rates at the long end of the curve fell further, although it is not clear whether this is a result of pessimism about the UK's growth prospects in the long run, or a decline in the term premium which reflects uncertainty about the future path of interest rates.

Allan gan / From: CAPITA ASSET SERVICES – TREASURY SOLUTIONS

ATODIAD / APPENDIX 2

Rhagolygon Economaidd / Economic Outlook

1. THE UK

1a. May Bank of England Quarterly Inflation Report

Over the last four quarters, we have had a continuing run of strong economic news which has consolidated confidence that the UK economy is recovering strongly. However, please note that the Governor said the economy “has only just begun to head back towards normal” after the slowest ever recovery from a recession. Widespread disbelief that unemployment would take nearly three years to fall to 7%, as the Bank forecast at the time of the August Inflation Report, has indeed proved to be well founded as the rate fell to 6.8% in Q1 2014 and then to 6.6% in quarter 2. Accordingly, this latest Inflation Report has seen the Bank provide a view of the economy as moving from a recovery supported by household spending to a more broadly based expansion sustained by:-

- Growth in business investment;
- A change from falling to rising real wages (average wage increases started to exceed the rate of CPI inflation over the last quarter but more recently, this situation has reversed back again);
- Increasing employment;
- Productivity growth to support those real wage increases and improve export competitiveness – expected to reach 2.5% by the end of 2014.

Key economic statistics in the Inflation Report were as follows: -

1. GDP has grown at an annual rate of 3.1% over the last four quarters;
2. Bank of England GDP forecasts: 2014 unchanged at 3.4%, 2015 upped from 2.7% to 2.9%, and for 2016 unchanged at 2.8%;
3. Inflation to be well behaved over the next two years: rising to 2.0% in two years’ time from 1.7% in Q2 2015;
4. Growth of productivity has only started to marginally improve, although it is expected to gradually rise back to its average historical rate.

We have reservations that the Bank’s current forecasts for GDP growth may be over optimistic and that strong economic growth could weaken as the main impetus has come from consumer spending and an uplift in borrowing to buy property. Whilst the release of this burst of pent up demand to buy property is having a very welcome effect on the economy, this surge is likely to fade in time and will then leave a question mark over where growth is going to come from. Basically, there are four main areas of demand in the UK economy: -

1. Consumers – but most consumers are maxed out on borrowing and trying to pay down debt. In addition, although <u>average</u> wage inflation is now higher than CPI inflation, many consumers are still experiencing declining disposable income as their wage increases are continuing to be less than inflation. This will not reverse until productivity and business investment improve, so as to warrant paying higher wages than are being paid currently. It is mainly higher wages that could provide a solid stimulus to an increase in consumer expenditure which would then underpin strong growth. There are also concerns that a significant number of mortgage holders are going to find it very difficult to manage increases in Bank Rate, and so in mortgage rates, when they do start.

2. Government – again, maxed out on borrowing and committed to austerity programmes to reduce its expenditure. Further austerity measures are still to come.

3. Foreigners buying our exports – but the EU, our major export market, is likely to experience tepid growth, at best, for the next few years. Also the rise in the value of Sterling means that imports are becoming cheaper which will cause UK consumers to increase purchases of cheaper imported goods in preference to UK produced competing products, so depressing UK GDP growth.

4. Business investment in fixed capital formation; but this has fallen from 13.5% to 10.4% of GDP over 2008 - 2013. However, there are encouraging signs that businesses are catching the upturn in optimism and are beginning to increase investment and exports into new markets in emerging countries. However, it will take a significant length of time for this start to make a material impact on total UK GDP growth rates and to take over the baton from consumers.

1b. The evolution of forward guidance

If you have been following the comments flying around through late June and early July, you may have ended up with the impression that Carney and other MPC members have been giving rather confused signals as to what the MPC's thoughts are when making "forward guidance" comments on what is going to happen to Bank Rate and when. Here is a quick recap of how forward guidance has evolved: -

1. **August 2013.** The MPC would not consider raising Bank Rate until the unemployment rate falls to 7%; this was deemed unlikely to occur until late 2016.

2. **February 2014 Quarterly Inflation Report.** Forward guidance mark 1 was abolished as the unemployment rate fell rapidly (the 7% threshold was breached in April 2014). Mark 2 'fuzzy guidance' was to be based on a range of about eighteen indicators but was still to be driven, ultimately, by the fundamental concept of how quickly the amount of slack in the economy after the recession, was used up. However, there were a wide range of views in the MPC as to how much slack there was and also around how quickly it would be used up, as there is no definitive and objective way of measuring this concept of slack. However, the Bank, and Carney, both commented that market views of likely increases in Bank Rate were in the right ball park (i.e. late 2014 / early 2015).

3. **14 May: 2014 Quarterly Inflation Report.** By this time, we had hard data that the UK economic recovery was going full steam ahead in 2014, i.e. this pointed to it being more likely that Bank Rate would have to go up sooner than had been expected previously. Instead of which, Carney went out on a limb and made comments to the effect that the possibility of any Bank Rate increase in 2014 and, arguably, even as soon as Q1 2015 was minimal. No other MPC member contradicted these comments, so the logical inference was that his comments must also have been a reflection of the view of the MPC.

4. **12 June: Carney Mansion House speech.** Carney expressed surprise that financial markets had not factored in a higher probability that Bank Rate could go up in 2014. To say that the financial markets were flabbergasted by this dramatic change of tack since a month ago was a bit of an understatement!

5. **18 June: MPC minutes.** The MPC said, (for a second time), that the decision on rates was becoming more balanced. It also said that the low probability (15%) attached in the markets to a rise in 2014 was "somewhat surprising". So Carney's comments at the Mansion House were not a Suarez moment of madness but rather comments that the whole MPC agreed with. So the financial markets now had to go back to where they started from; that they WERE right that a Bank Rate increase was likely in 2014, probably towards the end of the year (November 2014 would be the quarterly Inflation Report month when the MPC would be most likely to take action in

Q4). However, to be fair to Carney and the MPC, saying that 15% was too low leaves wide open just how too low this was, i.e. should it have been a 30% risk; or 70%? Do those comments really mean the financial markets are now right to pencil in a first increase in Q4 2014?

6. **24 June: Select Committee Carney comments.** An MP accused Carney of being an 'unreliable boyfriend' i.e. blowing hot one day and cold the next day. Overall, MPs felt that Carney's attempts at communicating forward guidance had been muddled and left the financial markets, and others, confused in as much as the various attempts at forward guidance had pointed in different directions. Carney attempted to dig himself out of this onslaught by emphasising that the timing for the FIRST increase in Bank Rate would be data driven i.e. no one could say for certain when that would occur. However, what he placed the most emphasis on was the medium term, i.e. the timing of the first increase was of a lesser degree of importance. So, in the medium term, increases would be **"limited and gradual".** Also, rates would not get back to around 5% as before the financial crisis. He also criticised the financial markets for not responding to the strength of recent economic data and commented that the MPC would change its views according to how data evolved. This evoked a response from one MP to say that in that case, forward guidance was redundant and we had returned to the days of "old fashioned smoke and mirrors"!

1c. So where are we now?

Let's make an attempt at trying to blow away the smoke of battle to see clearly where we are now: -

a. Since our previous interest rate forecast on 19 May, short Sterling rates (a good indicator for when financial markets expect the first increase in Bank Rate), have shifted significantly from indicating an early 2015 first increase to Q4 2014.

b. The one piece of guidance which appears to have emerged from the fray of battle unscathed is that in the medium term increases in Bank Rate will be **"LIMITED AND GRADUAL".** Also, rates would not get back to around 5% as before the financial crisis.

c. The MPC have also indicated their concerns that an earlier increase in Bank Rate could help them later with implementing a slower pace of increases in Bank Rate and keeping Bank Rate lower, than if there was a later timing for the first increase. It, therefore, becomes a matter of debate as to how rigidly they will be driven by actual data and what their 2 to 3 year forecasts for inflation (and on the other side of the same coin - slack), indicate, and instead how much weight they will put on their judgement to decide on the optimum time to vote for the first increase given their medium term concerns. Another way of putting this is 'should forecasters now be placing more weight on what they think the MPC will do, rather than what they think inflation, and other data, would warrant on their own in terms of the timing of the first increase in Bank Rate?'

ch. Many forecasters have, therefore, brought forward their forecast for the first increase in Bank Rate to take account of the various comments that have been made by the MPC and Carney and the fact that economic recovery in 2014 is likely to be very robust. (27.6.14 June Q1 GDP figure came in at an annual rate of 3.0%. Surveys and other economic data are now pointing to Q2 building further momentum to around an annual rate of 3.4%.) We agree with this movement and have moved forward our first increase in Bank Rate from Q4 2015 to Q1 2015.

d. But…and this little word BUT can have such a powerful effect! What would happen in the medium term if economic data were to take a nasty turn? Suppose the MPC over estimate the amount of slack in the economy and under estimate the speed with which it is used up? Or, to put it another way, suppose they get their forecasts for inflation over the next 2-3 years too low and inflation builds up quickly and threatens to become a significant risk. Could the commitment to "limited and gradual" increases in Bank Rate melt and disappear like snow on a balmy spring day? One wonders.

Accordingly, in our revised interest rate forecast, this earlier start to the timing of the first increase in Bank Rate has resulted in slight increases in Bank Rate in the two subsequent years compared to our previous forecast. However, we have slowed down the pace at which increases occur in line with the 'slow and gradual' forward guidance which has been emphasised recently.

2. THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

We can only repeat our previous warnings that we are in times when events can precipitate major volatility in markets. During this year we have seen a flight to safe havens resulting from investment flows out of emerging countries back to western economies as the prospects for higher growth in these economies has improved. This has been triggered by the Fed's start to tapering and successive months of reducing QE purchases by $10bn per month.
As for the EZ, while Ireland and Portugal have made very good progress and have been able to exit from their bail out programmes, there remains the prospect that Greece could require a third bailout package, though not one on the same scale as the first two.
A further concern over the EZ is the potential "Japanification" of the economy as some countries are now experiencing, or are very near to, deflation. Deflation causes a real increase in the value of debt. This is dangerous in itself for already heavily indebted countries but even more so where countries are still running up annual deficits of 3% or more. We are, therefore, concerned that some EZ countries experiencing low growth, will, over the next few years, see a significant increase in total government debt to GDP ratios. There is a potential danger for these ratios to rise to the point where markets lose confidence in the financial viability of one, or more, countries. However, it is impossible to forecast whether any individual country will lose such confidence, or when, and so precipitate a resurgence of the EZ debt crisis. While the ECB has adequate resources to manage a debt crisis in a small EZ country, if one, or more, of the larger countries were to experience a major crisis of market confidence, this would present a serious challenge to the ECB and to EZ politicians. All eyes are currently on the ECB in terms of whether they will provide further policy support, having resorted to negative interest rates in June in an effort to encourage financial institutions to lend into the "real economy".

3. CAPITA ASSET SERVICES FORWARD VIEW

We would remind clients of the view that we expressed in our previous interest rate revision newsflashes of just how unpredictable PWLB rates and bond yields are as we are experiencing volatility which is highly correlated to geo-political developments.

As there remain the threat of potential risks from a number of sources caution must be exercised in respect of all interest rate forecasts at the current time. The general expectation for an eventual trend of gently rising gilt yields and PWLB rates is predicted to remain unchanged, as market fundamentals will focus on the improved UK economic performance as well as issues such as the sheer volume of UK gilt issuance (and also US Treasury issuance) and the price of those new debt issues. Negative (or positive) developments on the geo-political front as well as any fresh issues regarding an EZ-related sovereign debt crisis could significantly impact safe-haven flows of investor money into UK, US and German bonds and produce shorter term movements away from our central forecasts.

Our interest rate forecast is based on an initial assumption that we will not be heading into a major resurgence of the EZ debt crisis, or a break-up of the EZ, but rather that there will be a managed, albeit painful and tortuous, resolution of the debt crisis where EZ institutions and governments eventually do what is necessary - but only when all else has been tried and failed. Under this assumed scenario, growth within the EZ will be tepid for the next couple of years and, therefore, has the potential to dampen UK growth, as the EU is our biggest export market.

Our PWLB forecasts are based around a balance of risks. However, we would flag up the potential for upside risks, especially for longer term PWLB rates, as follows:-

- A further surge in investor confidence that robust world economic growth is firmly expected, causing a greater flow of funds out of bonds and into equities.
- UK inflation being significantly higher than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

Downside risks currently include:-

- The situation over Ukraine poses a major threat to EZ and world growth if it was to deteriorate into "economic warfare" between the West and Russia, where Russia resorted to using its control over gas supplies to Europe. Heightened political risks in the Middle East and East Asia could also trigger safe haven flows back into bonds.
- A failure to rebalance UK growth towards exporting and business investment causing a weakening of overall economic growth beyond 2014.
- A resurgence of the EZ sovereign debt crisis caused by ongoing deterioration in government debt to GDP ratios.
- Recapitalising of European banks requiring more government financial support.
- Lack of support by populaces in Eurozone countries for austerity programmes, especially in countries with very high unemployment rates e.g. Greece and Spain, which still face huge challenges in engineering economic growth to correct their budget deficits on a sustainable basis.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth in western economies, especially the Eurozone and Japan.
- There are also increasing concerns that the reluctance of western economies to raise interest rates significantly for some years. This plus the huge QE measures which remain in place (and may be added to by the ECB in the near future), has created potentially unstable flows of liquidity searching for yield and therefore heightened the potential for an increase in risks in order to get higher returns. This is a return of the same environment which led to the 2008 financial crisis.

ATODIAD / APPENDIX 3

Graddfeydd Credyd Gwrthbartion buddsoddi a'r adneuon a ddelir gyda phob un ar Mehefin 2014 *
Credit ratings of investment counterparties and deposits held with each as at 30 June 2014*

Grŵp Bancio/ Banking Group	Sefydliad/ Institution	Adneuon / Deposit £'000	Hyd (Galw tymor sefydlog) / Duration (Call / Fixed Term**)	Cyfnod (O/I)/ Period (From - To)	Graddfa Dychweliad/ Rate of Return %	Graddfa Tymor Hir Fitch Long Term Rating ****	Graddfa Tymor Byr Fitch Short Term Rating ****	Graddfa Tymor Hir Moody's Long Term Rating ****	Graddfa Tymor Byr Moody's Short Term Rating ****	Graddfa Tymor Hir Standard & Poor's (S&P) Long Term Rating ****	Graddfa Tymor Byr Standard & Poor's (S&P) Short Term Rating ****	Lliw Sector/Hyd Awgrymiedig/ Sector Colour / Suggested Duration
Lloyds Banking Group plc	Bank of Scotland plc	**8,513**	**Galw/ Call**	**n/a**	**0.40**	**A**	**F1**	**A1**	**P-1**	**A**	**A-1**	**Glas - 12 mis/ Blue - 12 months**
HSBC Holdings plc	HSBC Bank plc	**501**	**Galw/ Call**	**n/a**	**0.25**	**AA-**	**F1+**	**Aa3**	**P-1**	**AA-**	**A-1+**	**Oren – 12 mis / Orange – 12 months**
Santander Group plc	Santander UK plc	**49**	**Galw/ Call**	**n/a**	**0.40**	**A**	**F1**	**A2**	**P-1**	**A**	**A-1**	**Coch – 6 mis/ Red - 6 months**
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc	The Royal Bank of Scotland plc	**10,000**	**Galw/ Call**	**n/a**	**0.40**	**A**	**F1**	**Baa1**	**P-2**	**A-**	**A-2**	**Glas - 12 mis / Blue - 12 months**

* Ceir y Rhestr Benthyca Cymeradwyedig yn Atodiad 5 o'r Datganiad Strategaeth Rheoli Trysorlys 2014/15 Strategaeth Buddsoddi Blynyddol / The Counterparty Criteria can be found at Appendix 6 of the 2014/15 Treasury Management Strategy Statement / Annual Investment Strategy

** Sef tymor ar pwynt y buddsoddi/Being term at the point of investment.

*** During the quarter the Moody's Long Term rating for the Bank of Scotland pls was upgraded to A1 from A2. The bank is part nationalised and so this did not have a bearing on the investment criteria during the quarter.

**** Yn Atodiad 4 ceir y graddfeydd credyd cyfatebol ar gyfer y 3 asiantaeth graddio y cyfeirir atynt uchod./The equivalent credit ratings for the 3 rating agencies referred to above can be found at Appendix 4.

ATODIAD / APPENDIX 4

Graddfeydd Credyd Cyfartebol/
Equivalent Credit Ratings (Fitch, Moodys, S&P)

Tymor Hir Fitch Long Term	**Tymor Hir Moodys Long Term**	**Tymor Hir S&P Long Term**
AAA	Aaa	AAA
AA+	Aa1	AA+
AA	Aa2	AA
AA-	Aa3	AA-
A+	A1	A+
A	A2	A
A-	A3	A-
BBB+	Baa1	BBB+
BBB	Baa2	BBB
BBB-	Baa3	BBB-
Tymor Byr Fitch Short Term	**Tymor Byr Moodys Short Term**	**Tymor Byr S&P Short Term**
F1+	n/a	A-1+
F1	P-1	A-1
F2	P-2	A-2
F3	P-3	A-3